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PANEL VI: EQUAL PROTECTION
BACKWARD-LOOKING LAWS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION: THE CASE OF BLACK
REPARATIONS
Daniel A. Farber*
This Article explores two seemingly unrelated topics, proposals for black
reparations and the unitary approach to the Equal Protection clause
championed by Justice John Paul Stevens. As it turns out, the two have
surprisingly deep connections. The unitary approach, as exemplified by
Justice Stevens's equal protection jurisprudence, provides a valuable lens
for examining reparations. In turn, the reparations issue highlights
important features of the unitary approach.
Although his remarks on the subject have been largely forgotten by
constitutional scholars, Justice Stevens did have occasion to discuss the
issue of reparations only a few years after he joined the U.S. Supreme
Court.I Admittedly, linking black reparations with the Stevens approach to
equal protection may seem paradoxical, particularly with respect to his
early years on the Court. In those early years, Justice Stevens appeared to
be no friend of affirmative action: In Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, he authored an opinion that would have outlawed
affirmative action in education on statutory grounds. 2 In Fullilove v.
Klutznick, he sharply rejected a federal affirmative action plan, going so far
as to quote extensively from the Nazi Nuremberg laws as a comparison
point.3 His dissent was all the more noteworthy because Justices Warren
Burger, Byron White, and Lewis Powell-none of whom are exactly famed
for liberalism-provided the key votes to uphold the affirmative action
statute in question. Surely then, Justice Stevens would have been no fan of
an idea that is in many ways farther reaching than affirmative action.
* Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. Peter Maybarduk
provided valuable research. I would like to thank Dick Buxbaum, Goodwin Liu, and Adam
Samaha for comments on an earlier draft, as well as workshop participants at William
Mitchell Law School.
1. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 547 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Fullilove involved a
federal public works statute that set aside ten percent of the funds for minority-owned
businesses. 448 U.S. at 453. Dissenting from a six-Justice majority, Justice Stevens voted to
strike down the law. Id at 553-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 533 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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And yet, in the same Fullilove opinion that rejected a limited minority
set-aside for government contracts, Justice Stevens also expressed support
for black reparations. 4 Although he found the set-aside scheme in Fullilove
unsupportable, it was not because he opposed recompense to African
Americans. Justice Stevens was acutely aware of the "tragic class-based
discrimination against Negroes that is an indelible part of America's
history." 5  In response to this history, he said, a sweeping program of
reparations could be warranted. As he put it, "the wrong committed against
the Negro class is both so serious and so pervasive that it would
constitutionally justify an appropriate classwide recovery measured by a
sum certain for every member of the injured class."6  That such
compensation would not be token was implied by his further remark that he
was unsure "[w]hether our resources are adequate to support a fair remedy
of that character." 7
In an opinion that otherwise takes a grudging view of affirmative action,
perhaps these remarks might be dismissed as a peculiar aberration. Still, it
is striking that an apparently conservative opinion converges with some of
the proposals made by progressives today. 8 This Article explores the
implications of this convergence, in terms of Justice Stevens's approach to
equal protection and in terms of the normative case for reparations.
Admittedly, one might question whether the convergence was anything
more than a momentary, glancing encounter. After all, Justice Stevens
rejected the reparation justification for the statute that was before the Court
in Fullilove.9  Later, when his opinions became more favorable to
affirmative action, they were notable for their emphasis on the forward-
looking justifications for race conscious programs.' 0 One might infer, then,
that the offhand reference to reparations was overtaken by changes in his
approach to affirmative action. One might also suspect that, as a general
matter, he may have rejected retrospective justifications for statutory
classifications. This may or may not be correct, as a biographical matter.
For present purposes, however, the biographical question of the Justice's
current personal attitude toward reparations (if any) is not critical. What is
important is the conceptual question of how reparations fit into his unitary
approach to equal protection.
The unitary approach to equal protection turns out to provide an
illuminating perspective on reparations. As we will see in later equal
protection cases, Justice Stevens was not at all unwilling to accept
backward-looking justifications for other kinds of classifications-most
notably, for statutes providing assorted benefits to veterans in gratitude for
4. Id. at 537.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. An excellent overview of the current debate can be found in Alfred L. Brophy, The
Cultural War Over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1181 (2004).
9. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part I.B.
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their past service.ll A scheme that provided benefits to the "veterans" of
slavery is consistent with the themes addressed in these later opinions,
though Justice Stevens has also explored some of the pitfalls of backward-
looking statutes. 12
Part I begins this inquiry by examining Justice Stevens's proposed
unitary theory of equal protection and by briefly reviewing his application
of that theory to affirmative action. Part II then focuses on a specific aspect
of reparations-their retrospective character-and examines how Justice
Stevens has approached other statutes with backward-looking justifications.
Part III analyzes the reparations issue within the unitary equal protection
framework, while Part IV considers how this analysis can enrich our
understanding of the unitary approach. The Article closes with some
reflection on impartiality as a goal for the legal system, as exemplified in
equal protection doctrine in particular and judicial reasoning in general.
Two points should be made at the outset regarding the Article's
discussion of the reparations issue. First, this Article does not address the
political prospects or policy merits of reparations. The reparations idea may
not be politically viable or may be a less promising strategy for African
Americans than forward-looking reforms. Moreover, designing an
appropriate and effective mechanism for reparations would be far from
straightforward. The question addressed in the Article is merely whether
such programs would necessarily violate our constitutional idea of
equality-and even that question is addressed from only one of the possible
perspectives.
Second, conservative readers may think that any link between Justice
Stevens and the concept of reparations shows only that he is even more
liberal than they feared. But Justice Stevens's remarks in Fullilove did not
stem from an embrace of social transformation. Rather, they reflected a
more general perspective on equal protection: in particular, his view that
the role of judges is to assure the impartiality of government actions rather
than their wisdom.
Moreover, although conservatives may or may not support reparations, 13
the concerns that animate reparation proposals have wide resonance across
the political spectrum. President George W. Bush, speaking in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, gave voice to some of these
concerns. He observed that poverty of so many in the region "has roots in a
history of racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the
opportunity of America."' 14 He added, "We have a duty to confront this
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. Backward orientation is of course a hallmark of reparations. See Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 Colum. L.
Rev. 689, 692 (2003).
13. Conservative scholars such as Professors Posner and Vermeule are more sympathetic
than one might expect to such claims. See id.
14. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Pledges Federal Role in Rebuilding Gulf Coast, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 16, 2005, at Al.
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poverty with bold action." 15 Reparations advocates could not have said it
better. 16
Thus, Justice Stevens's past expression of support for reparations does
not necessarily reflect a distinctive ideological stance. The underlying
normative position is widely shared. What makes Justice Stevens unusual
is not his politics but his ability to dispassionately address such a
controversial issue. His enduring contribution to American jurisprudence
does not lie in his past or current views of reparations, nor even in his
unitary approach to equal protection laws. Rather, it lies in his effort to
embody a vision of legal impartiality in judicial decisions. This norm of
impartiality underlies both the unitary approach and Justice Stevens's
efforts to apply that approach to controversial issues such as racial justice.
I. THE STEVENS PERSPECTIVE ON EQUAL PROTECTION
Justice Stevens's approach to equal protection subjects all statutes to a
uniform standard, thereby encouraging a judge to separate political and
social controversies from legal analysis. In his thirty years on the Court,
Justice Stevens has espoused this unitary approach to equal protection with
remarkable consistency. This section begins by sketching his approach and
then examines how he has applied it to the specific issue of affirmative
action.
A. Equality and the Impartial Sovereign
The Supreme Court's current approach to equal protection features the
well-known three-tiered system of review. 17 Statutes based on certain kinds
of classifications, most notably race, are subject to strict scrutiny. Such
statutes are unconstitutional unless the government can prove them
necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose. 18  Other
classifications, with the leading example being gender, are subject to
middle-tier scrutiny: To be valid, these classifications must be substantially
related to an important government purpose. 19 All remaining statutory
classifications are subject to rational basis review: They need only be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. In practice, this
often means that they require only the most tenuous justification. 20
15. Id.
16. It is also worth noting that President Ronald Reagan signed the legislation providing
reparations to Japanese-American victims of the World War I1 internment. See Robert
Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40
B.C. L. Rev. 429, 451 (1998).
17. Current doctrine is explained and critiqued in Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality
Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 481 (2004).
18. Ironically, this approach was first articulated in two cases upholding racial
discrimination. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
19. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976).
20. Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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Justice Stevens has famously resisted this approach. His concurrence in
Craig v. Boren, in which the Court expanded the number of tiers from two
to three, provides perhaps the most notable statement of his view:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to
govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of
review in some cases and a different standard in other cases. Whatever
criticism may be leveled at a judicial opinion implying that there are at
least three such standards applies with the same force to a double
standard. 2 1
Justice Stevens continued in Craig by questioning whether the "tiers"
actually explained how the Court reached decisions or were even key
factors motivating those decisions.22
His criticism of the three-tier approach is not without foundation. It is
not hard to find purportedly rational basis cases where the Court has
actually probed the statute more deeply,23 middle-tier cases where the
actual degree of scrutiny seems higher 24 or lower than the articulated test,25
and compelling interest cases that in reality fail to apply that test.26 In
practice, then, the Court's analytical scheme has an uncertain relationship
with its actual decision making.
In place of the three-tiered test, Justice Stevens proposes a unified
approach. The key to this inquiry is the attempt to determine whether a
statute can plausibly be attributed to the action of an impartial sovereign:
In my own approach to these cases, I have always asked myself whether I
could find a "rational basis" for the classification at issue. The term
-"rational," of course, includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker
could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate
public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the
disadvantaged class. Thus, the word "rational"-for me at least-
includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must always
characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern
impartially. 27
A survey of Justice Stevens's equal protection jurisprudence as of 1987
concluded that he had followed this approach with great, though not
21. Craig, 429 U.S. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 211-14.
23. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down as irrational a state
constitutional restriction on the inclusion of gays and lesbians within civil rights statutes);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding a restriction on
a group home for the mentally disabled to be impermissible under the rational basis test).
24. Notably, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), seems to verge on strict
scrutiny.
25. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)
(upholding a gender distinction in a statutory rape prohibition with little serious scrutiny).
26. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding affirmative action while
implausibly purporting to apply the same strict scrutiny that would have been used if the
defendant had instead been discriminating against racial minorities).
27. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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complete, consistency. 28  The same consistency is evidenced by his
decisions in the nearly twenty years since then. 29
Rather than applying three varying standards for different categories of
cases, Justice Stevens's analysis asks the same three questions in every
case: "What class is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to
a 'tradition of disfavor' by our laws? What is the public purpose that is
being served by the law? What is the characteristic of the disadvantaged
class that justifies the disparate treatment?" 30 In considering how these
questions might be answered in the context of black reparations, we must
begin by seeing how Justice Stevens has addressed them in affirmative
action cases.
B. Affirmative Action
Since the 1970s, some of the most contentious equal protection cases
have involved affirmative action.31 Fullilove gave Justice Stevens his first
opportunity to discuss the constitutional dimension of affirmative action.
32
Fullilove involved a federal public works statute that set aside ten percent of
funding for minority-owned businesses. 33 Dissenting from a six-Justice
majority, Justice Stevens voted to strike down the law. 34
The flavor of the dissent can be gauged from the opening sentence, which
characterizes the set-aside as "creat[ing] monopoly privileges in a $400
million market for a class of investors defined solely by racial
characteristics." 35 One of Justice Stevens's key criticisms of the set-aside
was that Congress had never explained its definition of the class, which
included "citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking,
28. See Note, Justice Stevens's Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1146
(1987). Based on my review of all of Justice Stevens's equal protection opinions since that
time, I see no signs of a deviation from this approach.
29. Demonstrating this proposition would require a discussion of nearly two decades
worth of opinions, but no exceptions are apparent.
30. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 453.
31. It has also been a focal point of much important scholarship. On the question of
color-blindness, see, for example, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness,
91 Colum. L. Rev. 1060 (1991); Laurence H. Tribe, "In What Vision of the Constitution
Must the Law be Color-Blind?," 20 J. Marshall L. Rev. 201 (1986); William Van Alstyne,
Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775
(1979). For discussion of possible justifications for affirmative action, see Akhil Reed Amar
& Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1745 (1996); Elizabeth S. Anderson,
Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1195 (2002);
Girardeau Spann, The Dark Side of Grutter, 21 Const. Comment. 221 (2004).
32. The Court's deliberations in Fullilove are discussed in Mark V. Tushnet, The
Supreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967-1991: The View from the Marshall Papers,
36 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 473, 538 (1995). Tushnet observes, "Chief Justice Burger's
instinct in Fullilove was right: It is better to write a diffuse opinion reaching a result on
which all agreed than to attempt a false precision that divided the majority." Id.
33. Some troubling aspects of the statute and the legislative process are discussed by the
civil rights lawyer who successfully defended the statute before the Court, in Drew S. Days,
III, Fullilove, 96 Yale L.J. 453 (1987).
34. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
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Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. ''36 Justice Stevens found none of
the four purported justifications for the statutory scheme to be supportable.
For present purposes, the most important of these justifications was that
the set-aside was "a form of reparation for past injuries to the entire
membership of the class." 37 As noted earlier, Justice Stevens found a basis
for such reparations for African Americans, but not for the entire class of
beneficiaries. "Racial classifications," he said, require "the most exact
connection between justification and classification," and "[q]uite obviously,
the history of discrimination against black citizens in America cannot
justify a grant of privileges to Eskimos or Indians."'38 Even if all of the
included groups were entitled to some form of reparations for past harm,
there was no reason to assume that they suffered the same magnitude of
harm. 39 Although admitting the existence of a history of discrimination
regarding these groups, he found it insufficient to justify the statute: "[I]f
that history can justify such a random distribution of benefits on racial lines
as that embodied in this statutory scheme, it will serve not merely as a basis
for remedial legislation, but rather as a permanent source of justification for
grants of special privileges. '40 Without a
duty to attempt either to measure the recovery by the wrong or to
distribute that recovery within the injured class in an evenhanded way,
our history will adequately support a legislative preference for almost any
ethnic, religious, or racial group with the political strength to negotiate a
'piece of the action' for its members.41
Justice Stevens proceeded to dismiss the government's other three
arguments for the validity of the set-aside. He found no reason to think that
judicial remedies provided insufficient redress for firms that had been
injured in the past by discrimination.42 He also rejected the argument that
minority representatives were entitled to favor constituencies that had been
excluded from previous patronage-a sort of "equal access to pork"
argument. 43  Another justification--"facilitating and encouraging the
participation by minority business enterprises"-he viewed as
"unquestionably legitimate. '44 But the statute was not "designed to remove
any barriers to entry"; "[n]or does its sparse legislative history detail any
insuperable or even significant obstacles to entry into the competitive
market. '45 Thus, Justice Stevens had little difficulty in concluding that the
federal set-aside was invalid.
36. Id. at 535 (internal quotation omitted).
37. Id. at 536.
38. Id. at 537.
39. Id. at 538.
40. Id. at 539.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 541.
43. Id. at 542.
44. Id. at 542-43.
45. Id. at 543.
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Almost a decade later, a city ordinance based on the federal statute
upheld in Fullilove came before the Court. Not surprisingly, Justice
Stevens voted to strike down the ordinance, this time as part of the majority.
In Justice Stevens's discussion of this state-law reincarnation of Fullilove,
however, the reparation rationale received scant attention. Instead, Justice
Stevens distanced himself from the view that affirmative action must be
remedial in character. He proclaimed that "the Constitution requires us to
evaluate our policy decisions-including those that govern the relationships
among different racial and ethnic groups-primarily by studying their
probable impact on the future." 46 On close examination, he found the city's
version of the Fullilove set-aside ill considered, and indeed, a product of
"the type of stereotypical analysis that is a hallmark of violations of the
Equal Protection Clause." 47
Two intervening decisions had indicated that, despite these adverse
outcomes, Stevens was not implacably hostile to affirmative action. In
United States v. Paradise,48 he voted to uphold a judicial decree ordering a
police department to promote blacks and whites in a one-to-one ratio. In
his view, because the city had "been found guilty of repeated and persistent
violations of the law," it had the burden of demonstrating that "the
chancellor's efforts to fashion effective relief exceed the bounds of
'reasonableness.' 49  In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,50 he
dissented when the Court struck down a layoff provision that required
parity between white and minority layoffs in a school district. His analysis
was encapsulated in the opening paragraph of his Wygant dissent:
In my opinion, it is not necessary to find that the Board of Education
has been guilty of racial discrimination in the past to support the
conclusion that it has a legitimate interest in employing more black
teachers in the future. Rather than analyzing a case of this kind by asking
whether minority teachers have some sort of special entitlement to jobs as
a remedy for sins that were committed in the past, I believe that we should
first ask whether the Board's action advances the public interest in
educating children for the future. If so, I believe that we should consider
whether that public interest, and the manner in which it is pursued,
justifies any adverse effects on the disadvantaged group.51
With its emphasis on forward-looking justifications for affirmative
action, the Wygant dissent set the stage for Justice Stevens's later
jurisprudence on the subject.
46. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
47. Id. at515.
48. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
49. Id. at 193 (Stevens, J., concurring). This concurrence indicates a preference for
judicial over legislative remedies for past misconduct. Presumably, Justice Stevens would
find a judicial award of reparations to blacks to be less in need of careful examination than
statutory reparations.
50. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
51. Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A year after he rejected the municipal version of the Fullilove set-aside,
Stevens again embraced a forward-looking justification. He joined an
opinion for the Court upholding a minority preference in FCC licensing as
an instrument for achieving diversity. 52 He endorsed the Court's "focus on
the future benefit, rather than the remedial justification, of such
decisions." 53 Justice Stevens dissented strongly from a later overruling of
that decision. 54 He was particularly caustic in his later dissent about the
Court's application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action: "There is no
moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to
perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial
subordination." 55
The tone of Justice Stevens's affirmative action opinions has certainly
shifted since Fullillove. One can hardly imagine him including a
comparison to the Nuremberg laws in an affirmative action opinion today.
Moreover, he has not voted to strike down an affirmative action plan since
the municipal set-aside case. He has been equally opposed to the Court's
crusade against race conscious redistricting designed to increase minority
representation. 56
The shift in rhetoric and outcomes is apparent. The shift in legal analysis
may not have been as drastic. Justice Stevens's recent opinions on race-
based redistricting are entirely consistent with his views about redistricting
before he was even a member of the Court.57 The more recent affirmative
action statutes have been better designed and more carefully justified than
the Fullilove set-aside. For that reason, Stevens could legitimately have
found them distinguishable even if he continued to adhere to his Fullilove
dissent. Still, it seems plain that he has moved over time toward greater
acceptance of affirmative action.58
Justice Stevens's increasing focus on future-oriented justifications for
affirmative action may raise questions about his earlier willingness to
consider backward-looking justifications for affirmative action. His later
opinions do not expressly repudiate his endorsement of the concept of black
reparations in Fullilove, but neither has he repeated it. Logically, however,
the proposition that forward-looking justifications are stronger than
backward-looking ones does not mean that the latter are always insufficient.
Thus, his later affirmative action opinions do not directly address the
reparations rationale and leave it unclear whether he continues to support it.
He may well be less favorable to backward-looking justifications in race
cases than he was when Fullilove was decided. Clearly, it would be a
52. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
53. Id. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring).
54. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
55. Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
57. See Pamela S. Karlan, Cousins' Kin: Justice Stevens and Voting Rights, 27 Rutgers
L.J. 521 (1996).
58. John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1561 (2006).
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mistake to take his observation in Fullilove as a mature judgment about the
application of the unitary approach to reparations.
Given Justice Stevens's view of the unity of equal protection
jurisprudence, however, we should not analyze the reparations issue simply
by looking at race cases. Instead, we need to consider how he has viewed
backward-looking justifications in other equal protection settings, both
before and after Fullilove. Under his unitary approach, the legitimacy of
backward-looking justifications for statutes should not depend solely on the
type of classification. Rather, we should be sensitive to the ways that
backward-looking justifications raise similar issues, even if the specific
contexts ultimately require different outcomes.
The point of this analysis is not to speculate about how Justice Stevens
would decide the reparations issue if it came before him today. Rather, if
we take his approach to equal protection seriously, we must decouple it
from his personal views on specific issues. The important question is how
the unitary approach to equal protection fares when presented with a novel
and recondite issue, not how one specific Justice would vote. Examining
the rest of Justice Stevens's jurisprudence is necessary to see whether the
unitary approach provides coherent guidance to the reparation issue.
II. BACKWARD-LOOKING STATUTES AND THE IMPARTIAL SOVEREIGN
Although Justice Stevens may favor prospective justifications for laws,
he has not hesitated to accept retrospective ones under appropriate
circumstances. He has, however, been quite concerned about the correct
design of schemes providing compensation or rewards for past events.
Examining these cases provides important lessons about how to apply the
unitary approach to backward-looking statutes such as reparations.
A. The Propriety of Retrospective Justifications: The Veterans Cases
Justice Stevens's willingness to countenance retrospective justifications
is best illustrated by a trio of cases involving benefits for veterans. The first
of these cases, and the only one that is generally known today, was decided
a year before Fullilove. In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney,59 the plaintiffs challenged the state's heavy-handed preference for
veterans in public employment. This case illustrates the serious
consequences of veterans' preferences and also their acceptability to Justice
Stevens based on backward-looking justifications.
In Feeney, state law gave a preference to any veteran with an honorable
discharge who served at least one day during "wartime." 60 The preference
was absolute: A nonveteran could be hired only if there was no qualified
veteran to fill a position. 61 When the litigation began, over ninety-eight
59. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
60. Id. at 262.
61. Id. This is much stronger than any affirmative action plan for minorities is likely to
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percent of the veterans in the state were male.62 The effect was to exclude
women from civil service jobs unless the jobs were too undesirable to
attract male applicants. The asserted purposes of the preference were: (1)
to ease the transition of veterans to civilian status (which seemed unrelated
to the grant of a lifetime preference); (2) to encourage enlistment (which
seemed unlikely since the statute covered draftees and also applied only to
previous wars); and (3) to reward veterans (which the statute certainly did,
by favoring them over better qualified nonveterans). 63
The majority opinion by Justice Potter Stewart found no intent to
discriminate against women and hence no occasion for heightened
scrutiny.64 Justice Stevens added a brief concurrence, saying that any
implication of intentional gender discrimination was rebutted by the large
number of men disadvantaged by the statute.65 Notably, Justice Stevens did
not raise any question about the rationality of the statute, despite the
tenuousness of the forward-looking justifications and the substantial harm
to women. Moreover, his conclusion regarding the gender issue-
emphasizing that the statute was not "intended to benefit males as a class
over females as a class" 66-should not necessarily have been dispositive for
him, given that he had previously warned against an overemphasis on
legislative motivation in equal protection cases. 67 But apparently either he
viewed the question before the Court as limited to gender discrimination or
he did not find the statute in Feeney questionable enough in other respects
to require sustained inquiry. As two later cases make clear, the backward-
looking justification for veterans' preferences was one that Stevens could
wholeheartedly accept.
Six years after Feeney, the Court decided another veterans' preference
case, Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor.68 A New Mexico statute
created a curious property tax exemption for certain veterans. Qualifying
veterans received a two thousand dollar exemption (in perpetuity) from the
taxable value of their property. 69 To qualify, a veteran had to have been
honorably discharged, served on active duty for at least ninety continuous
days during the Vietnam War (which for some reason the state found
superior to two stints of eighty-nine days each), and have become a New
62. Id. at 270.
63. Id. at 265; see also id. at 286-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 280-81.
65. Id. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring).
66. Id.
67. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[Tihe
line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and
perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume."). For fuller
discussion of the distinction between disparate impact and discriminatory intent, and their
roles in Justice Stevens's thought, see George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination,
and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2313 (2006).
68. 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
69. Id. at 614.
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Mexico resident before May 8, 1976.70 The plaintiff had met all of the
requirements but the third, having moved to New Mexico five years after
the cut-off date, but two years before the statute was passed. 71
This statute seemed to have been designed to test the outer limits of
rational basis review, and it failed to pass. Chief Justice Burger's opinion
for the Court rejected the state's two purported justifications for the
requirement of pre-1976 residency. 72 The first justification was that the
provision was designed to encourage Vietnam veterans to move to New
Mexico. But statutes passed after the fact could hardly have motivated
veterans to move to New Mexico some years earlier. 73
The other alleged purpose of the law was to reward veterans who had
resided in the state during the Vietnam period.74 The purported justification
was that "those veterans who left their homes in New Mexico to fight in
Vietnam, as well as those who settled in the State within the few years after
the war ended, deserve to be treated differently from veterans who make
New Mexico their home after May 8, 1976"; that is, the "legislature is said
to have decided it owed a special responsibility to these 'established'
veterans." 75 Burger rejected this justification on two grounds: First, it was
irrational because it required no connection between prior residence and
military service-a soldier who had been in New Mexico only as an infant
would qualify.76 Second, it illegitimately created two tiers of residents,
discriminating on the basis of how long they had lived in the state, in
violation of precedents prohibiting favoritism toward long-time residents. 77
Justice Stevens, however, found a greater degree of rationality in this
retrospective benefit scheme. Apart from the interest in easing the
disruption caused by military service, he said, the government had a valid
interest in rewarding veterans for past conduct:
[T]he simple interest in expressing the majority's gratitude for services
that often entail hardship, hazard, and separation from family and friends,
and that may be vital to the continued security of our Nation, is itself an
adequate justification for providing veterans with a tangible token of
appreciation. 78
This statement is strikingly parallel to the assertion several years earlier
in Fullilove that contrition for past harm to blacks would be an adequate
justification for providing them with a tangible token of contrition. The fact
70. The cut-off date was another peculiarity, since it was a full year after the last day of
the Vietnam Era as proclaimed by President Ford, id. at 625 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and
even longer after the actual withdrawal of all U.S. troops.
71. Id. at 614 n.2. The statute had been enacted first in 1973 in limited form, but then
expanded in 1975, 1981, and 1983.
72. Id. at 622-23.
73. Id. at 619.
74. Id at 620.
75. Id. at 621.
76. Id. at 622.
77. Id. at 622-23.
78. Id. at 626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that the tangible token was in the form of a continuing benefit rather than a
one-time reward was irrelevant. 79 Indeed, the "perennial character of its tax
exemption may have been especially important in the minds of New
Mexico's legislators if their objective was to provide a symbolic expression
of New Mexico's invitation to rejoin the community on a long-term
basis." 80  Moreover, the state could reasonably conclude that "Vietnam
veterans who arrived in that State more than a year after the end of the
Vietnam epoch had successfully readjusted to civilian life in a sister State
prior to migrating to New Mexico." 81
For our purposes, the most important aspect of this dissent is the
insistence that reward for past sacrifices is an entirely sound justification for
a retroactive lifetime benefit. Justice Stevens reemphasized this point in a
follow-up case a year later. In New York v. Soto-Lopez, 82 the Court
considered a New York provision giving civil service preference to certain
veterans. To qualify for the preference-additional points added to exam
scores for government jobs-a veteran had to have been honorably
discharged, served during time of war, and have been a resident of New
York when entering military service. 83
A fractured Court struck down the provision. Justice William Brennan,
joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, and Lewis Powell,
found that the provision violated the right to travel by discriminating
against newcomers to the state. 84 Chief Justice Burger once again found a
violation of the rational basis test. 85 And Justice Stevens once again
dissented. 86 He thought the residence requirement even more defensible
than the one in Hooper:
If a State should grant a special bonus to fighter pilots who are residents
at the time of enlistment, to those who fought in the Battle of Midway, or
perhaps just to the few who received the Congressional Medal of Honor-
would it violate the Equal Protection Clause to deny bonuses to
79. Id. at 628.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 631. The logic of this observation is obscure. One could assume with equal
justification that moving between states was a sign that a particular veteran had not yet fully
settled into civilian life and therefore was especially in need of state assistance. The statute
also seems a poor fit in other respects. It provides assistance only to the best-off veterans,
those who are able to purchase real estate. It also fails to distinguish between those who saw
combat and those with stateside desk jobs, while ignoring those individuals such as Peace
Corps volunteers who made other sacrifices for the national interest. The assumption that all
veterans during a given period made great sacrifices for their country, and that no nonveteran
was similarly self-sacrificing, could be regarded as an example of habitual, stereotyped
thinking.
82. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
83. Id. at 900.
84. Id. at911.
85. Id. at 913 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
86. See id. at 916 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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comparable veterans who moved into the State after the end of the War? I
think not .... 87
He also joined Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's dissent.88 She found it
hard to credit the idea that the Equal Protection Clause requires New York
to reward the sacrifices of all those who joined the Armed Forces from
other States and came to reside in New York if it wishes to reward the
service of those who represented New York in the Armed Forces.89
This line of cases about "affirmative action for veterans" establishes three
points about how the unitary approach to equal protection has worked in
Justice Stevens's hands. First, the state may award benefits to individuals
purely on the basis of past events, rather than in order to create an incentive
for future conduct. Second, the state may make relatively fine distinctions
in doing so (as between veterans who were state residents when drafted or
who lived in the state within a few years after the end of the war, versus all
other veterans of the same war). Third, the benefits need relate only
loosely, if at all, to the past events. Medals, monuments, cash payments,
preference over more qualified applicants for government jobs, and lower
real estate taxes are equally acceptable "tangible tokens."
This is not to say, however, that the state can be completely arbitrary in
structuring backward-looking statutes, even outside the racial context of
Fullilove. Rather, in applying the unitary approach to equal protection,
Justice Stevens has scrutinized such benefit schemes for rationality, and he
has sometimes found them wanting for reasons that warrant our attention.
The issues of benefit design bear significantly on the permissibility of black
reparations schemes.
B. Flawed Benefit Design
Within his first five years on the Court, Justice Stevens confronted two
cases involving unintended legislative omissions from benefit schemes. He
voted to uphold one scheme and strike down the other. Interestingly
enough, Justice Brennan took precisely the opposite position in each case,
highlighting the nonideological nature of the issues.
In Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 90 the omission from
the statutory scheme seems to have been entirely accidental. The case
stemmed from misconduct by the United States government against the
Delaware Indians in the mid-nineteenth century. 9 1 A court later concluded
87. Id. at918.
88. See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 925. Although he might retain the same view of the equal protection issue,
Justice Stevens might vote today to strike down the laws in Hooper and Soto-Lopez as
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's "privileges or immunities" clause. See Saenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (holding that the clause prohibits states from discriminating
between its citizens on the basis of length of residency in the context of welfare benefits).
90. 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
91. Id. at 75-76.
2284 [Vol. 74
BA CKWARD-LOOKING LAWS
that the government had acted unlawfully, and Congress appropriated
money to satisfy the judgment.92 The problem was that in the century
between the violation and the court decree, the tribe had split into several
groups. One group joined the Cherokees but later reformed itself as a
separate tribe. Another group migrated to Oklahoma. Finally, there were
the plaintiffs--descendants of Indians who left the tribe after the
government's wrongdoing and had remained in Kansas. 93 When they left
the tribe, the government promised them their "just proportion" of the
tribe's assets held in trust by the United States.94 The majority speculated
about various reasons that conceivably might have led Congress to exclude
this group from their promised fair share of the assets, and it then upheld
the statute under the rational basis test.95
Justice Stevens took a different view. He emphasized that the Indian
Claims Commission had specified that any recovery must be "for the
benefit of all of the descendents of the Delaware Nation as constituted in
1829 and 1854."96 The plaintiffs were members of that class, and the
evidence was clear that Congress simply excluded them by accident, with
no awareness of their existence or their claim to recovery. 97 For four
reasons, he concluded that the statute was unconstitutional:
First, the members of the class whose rights were adjudicated by the
Indian Claims Commission have more than an ordinary interest in equal
treatment. Second, there is no need for any discrimination at all within
this class of litigants; this, therefore, is not a case in which the need to
draw some line may justify the otherwise arbitrary character of the
particular line which has been drawn. Third, no principled justification
for the particular discrimination against the Kansas Delawares has been
identified. And fourth, there is no reason to believe that the
discrimination is the product of an actual legislative choice. Under these
circumstances, I conclude that there has been a deprivation of property
without the "due process of lawmaking" that the Fifth Amendment
guarantees. 98
Three years later, the Court was confronted with another instance of
unintentional legislative exclusion, this time through special interest
machinations rather than pure oversight. United States Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz99 involved a revision to the Railroad Retirement Act. Under
the original statute, individuals who worked for a railroad and who also
spent part of their careers in nonrailroad work could collect both social
security and railroad retirement pay. 10 0 This dual payment could be
92. Id. at 90.
93. Id. at 78.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 89-90.
96. Id. at 91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 92-94.
98. Id. at 97-98 (citations omitted).
99. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
100. Id. at 168.
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considered a windfall, because these two-career employees could receive
more retirement income than individuals who spent their entire career in the
railroad industry.10' On the view that these dual payments endangered the
financial stability of the railroad retirement system, Congress eliminated
them prospectively but grandfathered employees whose retirement benefits
had already vested.'0 2 So far, this seems perfectly reasonable.
Unfortunately, when the legislation was actually drafted by the union and
industry, the grandfather provision had a subtle flaw. In drafting the
provision, the union and industry excluded workers that neither of them
cared about: workers who had qualified for the dual benefits but were no
longer connected with the railroad industry in 1974.103 Naturally, the union
was less interested in those workers than in those who remained active
members at the time. The industry also had little reason to care about
workers who had moved into other fields. Congress seems to have been
entirely unaware that it was stripping these workers of vested retirement
rights.
In a fairly brusque opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld
the statute. In the majority's view,
Congress could properly conclude that persons who had actually acquired
statutory entitlement to windfall benefits while still employed in the
railroad industry had a greater equitable claim to those benefits than the
members of appellee's class who were no longer in railroad employment
when they became eligible for dual benefits. 104
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall. 0 5 He emphasized
the special interest nature of the drafting process and the apparent intent of
Congress to preserve all vested benefits. 10 6 Whatever the abstract equities
of the dual benefits, workers had been given every reason to think that they
could rely on these vested benefits in planning their careers.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the basis that Congress
needed to draw some line among beneficiaries and that current employment
status was an "impartial method" of drawing that line. 10 7 Apparently, the
need for line drawing, plus the absence of any prior adjudication of rights,
was enough to distinguish Fritz from Delaware Tribal for Stevens.
In the two cases we have just considered, Congress inadvertently
excluded a subclass from a benefit. These cases bear on Justice Stevens's
concern in Fullilove about the careless choice of beneficiaries and benefit
levels. Fullilove also reflects a concern about entrenching permanent
hierarchies of favored classes, and this concern, too, found expression in a
later case.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 169-70.
103. Id. at 172.
104. Id. at 178.
105. See id. at 182 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 185-90.
107. id. at 182 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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In Nordlinger v. Hahn,10 8 the Court upheld the constitutionality of
California's Proposition 13. Proposition 13 freezes property tax
assessments until property is resold (except for a small inflation
adjustment). 10 9 The result is that two owners of identical homes may pay
vastly different taxes, so that new owners bear a much higher share of the
tax burden than long-time residents. 110 The Court fairly easily upheld this
provision under the rational basis test as serving two purposes: the state's
interest in preventing excessive property turnover and the greater reliance
interest of more established owners. II1
Justice Stevens filed a fervent dissent. He referred to the notorious
inflation of California property values, which made California real estate
investors "among the most fortunate capitalists in the world.""12
Proposition 13 had given these investors a tremendous windfall, and Justice
Stevens said that for that reason he would refer to them in the dissent as the
"Squires." ' 1 3  As a result of Proposition 13, he observed, "some
homeowners pay 17 times as much in taxes as their neighbors with
comparable property."" 14
Justice Stevens particularly objected to another provision of Proposition
13, which allows transfer of property to children without reassessment:
"This exemption can be invoked repeatedly and indefinitely, allowing the
Proposition 13 windfall to be passed from generation to generation." 1 5 He
characterized this provision as establishing "a privilege of a medieval
character: Two families with equal needs and equal resources are treated
differently solely because of their different heritage." 116  Because this
benefit was not linked to any specific need of these later generations, it
represented nothing more than a hereditary privilege akin to medieval
nobility.
C. The Reparations Argument and the Fullilove Dissent Revisited
This examination of other equal protection opinions by Justice Stevens
confirms that his treatment of the reparations argument in Fullilove was not
an aberration. In terms of the legitimacy of the goal of reparations, he now
clearly prefers forward-looking rationales for affirmative action over
remedial ones, and he might vote against reparations on that basis.
But the unitary approach could support a more welcoming approach to
reparations. As shown in particular by the veterans' benefit cases and
Delaware Tribal, the unitary approach to equal protection does leave room
108. 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
109. Id. at 5-6.
110. Id. at 6.
111. Id. at 17.
112. Id. at 28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 29.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at30.
2006] 2287
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
for backward-looking justifications: The state sometimes can legitimately
compensate for past burdens borne by its citizens, particularly when the
government had a direct hand in creating those burdens. Indeed, no Justice
has ever rejected this principle, even when faced with such an unreasonable
preference as the one upheld in Feeney. When veterans preferences have
been struck down, it has been because of lines drawn between veterans, not
because they favored veterans over other citizens. If it is permissible to
compensate veterans for the burdens they have borne, why should it be per
se impermissible to compensate the benefits of slavery and discrimination
for their burdens?
Yet, the concerns about statutory design expressed in Fullilove are also
well grounded in the unitary approach to equal protection. The "due
process of lawmaking" argument in Delaware Tribal highlights the
importance of careful deliberation in designing compensatory statutes. The
pointed dissent in Nordlinger also reflects a concern that was very much
present in Fullilove about permanently entrenching legal hierarchies in the
guise of responding to social equities.
Thus, within the context of the unitary approach developed by Justice
Stevens, the discussion of reparations in Fullilove is consistent with an
overall vision of government impartiality. That vision does not require the
government to ignore past injustices, particularly those it helped to create.
But it does require that any effort to redress those injustices be calibrated to
the equities, tied to ascertainable disadvantages, and crafted so as to avoid
the creation of new hierarchies of favored citizens.
III. BLACK REPARATIONS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
With these other equal protection opinions in mind, we return to the
question of reparations that Justice Stevens raised in Fullilove. The
reparation issue has begun to reemerge today, and deserves continued
attention if only for that reason. 117 We begin by reviewing the current state
of the reparations debate and then consider the constitutional issues.
A. The Reparations Issue
The reparations issue has given rise to vigorous scholarly debate." 18
Some of the debate concerns the application of private law theories of
117. The reparations issue may or may not turn out to have genuine political or legal
traction (a question which is discussed in Part III.A). But the reparations issue is worth
considering regardless of its practical prospects. The deeper questions are: How have our
current social problems been shaped by our bitter racial history and how should we respond
to that heritage. Those are questions that we cannot afford to ignore.
118. For a sampling of viewpoints, see Brophy, supra note 8; Hanoch Dagan et al.,
Symposium: The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1135 (2004);
Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black Reparations, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1177 (2004);
Calvin Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 24 B.C.
Third World L.J. 157 (2004); Michelle E. Lyons, Note, World Conference Against Racism:
New Avenues for Slavery Reparations?, 35 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1235 (2002).
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liability in this setting. More attention, however, has been given to the
broader policy issues. The argument for reparations is at heart a simple
one. We recognize today that slavery was one of the great crimes of
history, followed by a long and shameful legacy of legalized discrimination.
These wrongs have never been fully acknowledged-not even in the form
of an explicit apology-nor has recompense been made. This legacy,
reparation advocates say, must be confronted and overcome if the current
plight of African Americans is to be addressed seriously.' 19
Opponents of reparations do not question the injustice of slavery and Jim
Crow. They do question whether reparation is a sensible response. They
see reparations as deeply divisive, increasing, rather than healing, racial
divisions. Opponents also fear that reparations will undermine the ability of
African Americans to take the initiative, and assume responsibility for their
own futures. And the critics raise a host of questions about how to calculate
the damages for this past misconduct and to distribute those damages to
current generations of African Americans. 120
The most glaring question is whether reparations are too impractical to be
worth serious analysis. It may seem, in Saul Levmore's words, that
"African American reparations are unlikely to materialize, and are perhaps
as unlikely as a renegotiation with current American Indians regarding the
purchase of Manhattan Island long ago or as a recovery from present
Southerners for the firing on Fort Sumter."' 121 This observation gains force
from public opinion polls showing that only four percent of whites would
support payment of compensation for slavery (as opposed to two-thirds of
blacks who support such payments). 122
Dismissing reparations as a hopeless pipe dream may be a mistake.
There are significant international precedents. For example, Australia has
returned almost a hundred thousand square miles of land to Aborigines. 123
Turning to the United States, Florida paid survivors of the 1923 Rosewood
Massacre $150,000 each and made substantial payments to the descendants
of others. 124 The United States also paid roughly $800 million to Native
119. Some of the key arguments for reparations are made in Roy L. Brooks, Atonement
and Forgiveness: A New Model for Black Reparations 119-63 (2004); Anthony E. Cook,
King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense of Black Reparations, 68
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 959 (2000); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Repairing the Past: New Efforts in
Reparations Debate in America, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 279 (2003); Westley, supra note
16.
120. These objections are discussed in Brophy, supra note 8; Epstein, supra note 118; and
Massey, supra note 118. Adrian Vermeule cogently responds to the concerns about
ascertaining the amount of reparations in a forthcoming paper, pointing out the critics would
in effect set the level of reparations at zero, which is even less justifiable than any specific
higher number. See Adrian Vermeule, Reparations of Rough Justice (Univ. of Chi. Law &
Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 260, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract id=813086.
121. Saul Levmore, Privatizing Reparations, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1291, 1292 (2004).
122. Brophy, supra note 8, at 1184. Another poll showed the level of white support to be
somewhat higher, at eleven percent. See Levmore, supra note 121, at 1293 n. 10.
123. Lyons, supra note 118, at 1241.
124. Id. at 1243. For background on the Massacre, see Remembering Rosewood,
http://www.displaysforschools.com/history.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
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Americans for wrongfully seized land as early as 1946, as well as $1.65
billion to wrongfully interned Japanese Americans more recently. 125 So
reparations are not an untouchable political subject in other settings.
Moreover, there are at least faint signs of support for black reparations.
The federal government paid $9 million to African Americans who were
denied treatment for syphilis as part of the infamous Tuskegee
experiments.126 In another gesture of political support, California passed a
statute requiring insurance companies to submit records of slaveholder
insurance policies to a central registry. 127 Thus, at least a glimmer of hope
may exist for ultimate public support for some kind of reparations program,
at least enough so that consideration of the issue is not completely without
practical significance. 128
In addition, some of the resistance to reparations might be muted through
creative benefit systems. Dean Levmore himself proposes a privatized
reparations scheme that might avoid some of the political objections. The
scheme involves incentives for private financing of funds to compensate
black World War II veterans for wartime discrimination and to encourage
high school graduation, for a total of around $10 billion. 129 No doubt this is
only one of a number of possible innovative mechanisms that could be
identified if support for reparations was sufficient.
B. The Constitutional Legitimacy of Reparations
However a reparation mechanism might be designed, the first question
remains whether the goal of black reparations is itself constitutional.
Arguably, under the current affirmative action doctrine, reparation might be
considered an effort to remedy "societal discrimination" and therefore
illegitimate. At best, if reparations were considered to be a race-based
remedy, strict scrutiny would be used to determine whether the reparation
scheme was justified by a compelling state interest. Whether a reparation
scheme could survive such scrutiny is unclear. 130 Japanese-American
reparations did survive strict scrutiny, on the theory that the government
had a compelling interest in making recompense for past wrongs.131 To the
125. Levmore, supra note 121, at 1303 n.50.
126. Id.
127. Lyons, supra note 118, at 1264.
128. Charles Ogletree also cites two other examples: an Oklahoma statute and a Chicago
city ordinance. See Ogletree, supra note 119, at 280-81. Moreover, as he points out,
Congress waived the statute of limitations in a suit involving discrimination by the
Department of Agriculture against black farmers in the South. Id. at 303.
129. Levmore, supra note 121, at 1300-01.
130. Arguably, because the burden for reparations would rest with taxpayers generally,
rather than harming a discrete class of whites, reparations would be more likely than
affirmative action to survive judicial review. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 714-
23.
131. Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The court ducked the question of
what level of scrutiny to apply, concluding that the statute would past strict scrutiny:
In enacting the Civil Liberties Act, Congress sought to remedy "a grave
injustice" and "fundamental violations" of "basic civil liberties and constitutional
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extent they can be linked persuasively with governmental misconduct rather
than private bias, the harms created by slavery and de jure discrimination
might also be recognized. Therefore, black reparations might survive
judicial review, even if subjected to strict scrutiny, so long as they did not
fall victim to a per se rule against remedies based on societal
discrimination.
Regardless, reparations might also escape strict scrutiny on formalistic
grounds. A decent argument exists that payments to the descendants of
slaves would not be technically race based. 132  Arguably, being a
descendant of slaves is no more inherently racial than being able to become
pregnant is gender related-and the Supreme Court has solemnly
pronounced pregnancy and gender unrelated.' 33 For similar reasons, being
an identified victim of Jim Crow or the descendant of such a victim might
not be considered a race-based category. Just as with pregnancy and
gender, one might argue that the government's purpose is not to distinguish
between people because of their race even though this is an inevitable result
of reparations. Depending on whether this argument was accepted and on
whether remedying widespread past discrimination was considered a
legitimate basis under the appropriate standard of review, black reparations
might be held per se illegitimate, subject to strict scrutiny, or subject only to
rational basis review.
One clear sign of the intellectual vacuity of current equal protection
doctrine is its inability to provide clear guidance on such a basic issue as
reparations. 134 As two leading theorists observe about one aspect of the
constitutional analysis, "the twisting course of the Court's jurisprudence in
this area suggests that any abstract pronouncement should be eyed
skeptically until the Court cashes it out in an actual holding."' 35
rights." In particular, Congress found that the Japanese internment policies "were
carried out without adequate security reasons" and "were motivated largely by
racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a failure of political leadership." "The
Government unquestionably has a compelling interest in remedying past...
discrimination by a state actor," especially discrimination as ugly as the policies
endorsed by the government in Korematsu v. United States. Unless Mr. Jacobs can
show that he, like the children of Japanese descent, was interned because of racial
prejudice, then it seems obvious that the remedy Congress chose in the Civil
Liberties Act (compensating children of Japanese but not German descent) is
substantially related to the ends of the Act (compensating those who were interned
because of racial prejudice). The remedy, in fact, would represent a "perfect fit
between means and ends."
Id. at 319 (citations omitted) (omission in original).
132. See Massey, supra note 118, at 172.
133. Not, as you might be thinking, in jest. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-97
(1974).
134. In theory at least, certain members of the Court should be interested in evidence of
the original understanding as it bears on this issue. In this regard, the Southern Homestead
Act of 1866 should be relevant. That statute gave freedmen a limited period to purchase
lands in eighty-acre plots. See Westley, supra note 16, at 460. Whether the originalists on
the Court would pay any heed to history that so strongly conflicts with their predilections is
anyone's guess.
135. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 717.
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The unitary approach to equal protection provides a firmer basis for
analysis. If the United States can properly compensate Indian tribes for
injuries incurred a century or more ago, there seems no reason to view such
compensation as inherently objectionable when the recipients are the
descendents of West African tribal people kidnapped from their homeland.
Indeed, in Delaware Tribal, Justice Stevens argued that it would be
unconstitutional to deny compensation even to descendants of individuals
who had left the tribe after the wrong was done. 136
It is true that such reparations would have a racial correlation. But this
was also true with the Japanese-American reparations. If society
deliberately harms a specific racial group, compensation will necessarily
have a racial connection. However, it would be horribly ironic to enslave
people because of their race, and then to refuse to compensate them because
to do so would be race based.
If reparation had been made during Reconstruction, it would have been
impossible to argue that the payments to ex-slaves were impermissibly
based on race. It would have been obvious that payment was not based on
any stereotyping or racial bias, but simply on the individual experience of
involuntary servitude. Similarly, if a Southern state had agreed to make
recompense to citizens who had been previously forced to attend all-black
schools, a serious constitutional challenge would be hard to imagine. What
makes reparations seem more normatively problematic today is that so
much time has passed. But this concern is better seen as a challenge to
designing an acceptable reparation scheme than as a fundamental normative
objection.
C. Design Issues
Because the linkage issue has been identified as the most fundamental
problem with reparations, 137 it is a good place to start. In Fullilove, Justice
Stevens suggested that a reparation scheme needed to make at least a
serious effort to link harms and beneficiaries. 138 This requirement is
entirely consistent with his views regarding other backward-looking
statutes, notably Delaware Tribal, although Fritz indicates that some of the
line drawing may justifiably be imprecise.
One way of establishing linkage would be to identify smaller classes of
beneficiaries linked with specific historic wrongs-for example, a
reparation bill for the heirs of victims of lynchings. A more general
reparation remedy would require at least statistical proof of ongoing harm
from past events. Clearly, not everything that ails present-day blacks can
be traced (except in the most general terms) to slave or even Jim Crow
136. Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 94 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, Holocaust Reparations Litigation: Lessons for the Slavery
Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 615, 621 (2003) (noting that the
inability to link is the "most difficult challenge" for litigation-based reparation, so that the
main use of reparation rationale is as a political argument for affirmative action).
138. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 539 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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times. Many aspects of black-white comparison have changed in the past
fifty years, often for better but sometimes for worse.
One particularly stubborn measure of inequality, however, has been net
wealth. As two commentators recently observed,
The average African-American family's net worth is about twelve percent
of the average white family's net worth. And that huge disparity is not
explained by factors like earnings rates, education, or savings rates. More
than 25% of of [sic] black households have no positive wealth, while just
14% of white households are in that situation. 139
Exclusion from housing markets may have had a particularly sharp effect
on black wealth, especially given the run-up in housing values in recent
decades. 140 It may well be possible to provide both theoretical and
empirical economic arguments for the long-term persistence of such
inequalities. 14 1 This would support linkage between low measures of
wealth for blacks today and historic wrongs. 142 Thus, measures designed to
promote capital accumulation by blacks may well be justified as redress for
the long-term effects of past discrimination.
Another important design question concerns the type of benefits. If the
veterans benefits cases are any guide, the type of benefit does not
necessarily need to be linked in any precise way with the type of harm.
Nevertheless, under Justice Stevens's equal protection analysis, the benefit
must respond in some way to the historic injustice. For example, if low
intergenerational transmission of net wealth (due partially to past
139. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist
Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 Geo. L.J. 1, 172 (2004). The remainder of this
paragraph is also worth repeating:
Those born into an African-American family are three times more likely to find
themselves living below the poverty line than are those born into a white
family.... Similarly, those born into single parent households are three times
more likely to find themselves living in poverty than are those born to two-parent
households. Those who happen to be born in Mississippi are more than twice as
likely to find themselves starting off in poverty than are those lucky enough to be
born in Connecticut. And those who are born into poverty tend to end up far
poorer than those born into wealth, with concomitantly lower levels of overall
health, occupational opportunities, consumption patterns, and life-expectancies.
Id. at 171-72 (citations omitted).
140. Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of African American Reparations to
Redirect America's Future, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1689, 1700-03 (2002).
141. Having less wealth to act as a cushion during labor market fluctuations, blacks may
have had a more fragile position in labor markets. See id. at 1703. This in turn might have
affected labor market choices, making blacks more risk averse in career choices (and thus
predictably lowering expected future incomes in exchange for reduced risk).
142. For further discussion of racial wealth disparities and their implications, see Emma
Coleman Jordan & Angela P. Harris, Economic Justice: Race, Gender, Identity and
Economics 473-90, 501 (2005). These arguments might be bolstered by a showing that the
federal measures that helped expand the white middle class after World War II were
designed, at the insistence of Southern legislators, to avoid any threat to segregation. For a
discussion of the historical record, see Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White:
An Untold History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America 113-41 (2005)
(focusing on the G.I. Bill).
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discrimination in home-buying opportunities, for example) is identified as a
legacy of historic injustices, then the remedies should be geared to
providing increased savings or otherwise improving intergenerational
capital transfers for blacks.
In addition, as Justice Stevens has insisted both in Fullilove and in the
Proposition 13 case, we must be wary of permanently carving into stone
any division between the beneficiaries of special government treatment and
others. This suggests that relief should have a strict time span (for example,
by setting up a trust that must expend its assets by a fixed date). The goal
should be to deliver complete relief within that time span. Our society does
not need to recreate another hierarchy based on ancestry.
The veterans' benefits cases highlight some other potential pitfalls of
retrospective benefit schemes. No doubt the Court was right that the statute
in Feeney unintentionally disadvantaged women. The fact remains,
however, that the statute did impose a significant barrier against women in
public sector employment and sharply limit their ability to participate in the
shaping of public policy in the state. Moreover, it deprived the citizens of
the state of their input and of the services of highly qualified people. A
reparation scheme must be shaped with care lest it create similar negative
side effects.
The other veterans cases and the Proposition 13 case illustrate another
pitfall: the ease with which benefit schemes can become unmoored,
captured on the one hand by parochial interests (such as favoring longtime
residents over newcomers), and on the other hand creating perpetual
benefits (such as tax exemptions) with no particular connection to any past
burden. These defects would be even more serious when tied to racial
divisions. Vigilance will be required to keep a reparation scheme firmly on
track.
The appropriate institution for establishing a reparation scheme may well
vary with the class of beneficiaries and the type of benefit. Where the
stringent requirements of liability can be overcome, a judicial remedy may
be appropriate. States might provide at least limited reparations based on
their own individual histories, as Florida has done with the Rosewood
Massacre. In the end, however, Congress seems to be the most appropriate
body, as the voice speaking for the nation as a whole.
Whether reparations are a wise policy is not something addressed here.
Even a serious attempt to pursue reparations could have serious political
costs in dividing blacks from other minority groups and in increasing
polarization with whites. Designing an acceptable scheme may simply not
be feasible. Whether the benefits of the effort would be worth the costs,
even if a victory seemed politically feasible, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
Instead, the question has been posed here in the terms established by the
unitary approach to equal protection: Could an impartial sovereign have
plausible grounds to enact such a scheme, taking into account its effects on
all classes of citizens? The problems of design are certainly not trivial.
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Nevertheless, Justice Stevens's observation in Fullilove seems to be correct,
in terms of the fundamental defensibility of reparations.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: OF IMPARTIAL JUSTICE AND IMPARTIAL
JUSTICES
Impartiality is a virtue that figures in Justice Stevens's thinking in several
different ways. As we have seen, the "impartial sovereign" is the
touchstone of his equal protection analysis. Although Justice Stevens has
not done so, this vision of impartiality could well be supplied with deep
philosophical roots in liberal theories of justice. Certainly, the notion of the
impartial sovereign has at least a family resemblance to the views of
philosophers such as John Rawls, who posited that just decisions (at least of
fundamental kinds) should be made behind a "veil of ignorance" about how
they affect us. 143  Similarly, Ronald Dworkin's emphasis on the
government's obligation to give "equal concern and respect" to each citizen
resonates with Justice Stevens's approach to equal protection.144
Impartiality provides an appealing grounding for equal protection law for
several reasons. First, unlike equal protection norms that focus on the
protection of specific groups, impartiality can be embraced without first
passing judgment on the current social and political order. Such judgments
may be necessary at some point in applying any approach to equal
protection, but it seems more prudent not to elevate these judgments to
fundamental postulates. Second, impartiality resonates with basic moral
and legal norms. Favoritism and bias are not appealing bases for decisions.
Essentially, impartiality rules them out of order as justifications for laws.
Third, in contentious cases like affirmative action, a focus on impartiality
helps draw judges away from reliance on their policy preferences. To say
that an action is necessitated by a compelling government interest is in
effect to endorse its wisdom; to say that the same decision could plausibly
have been made by an impartial decision maker requires no commitment to
its validity. Finally, in a highly diverse democratic society, the least that
groups can expect is some plausible, impartial explanation for actions that
harm them. Anything less treats their interests as unworthy of
consideration by the government.
Impartiality also responds to an aspiration regarding the judicial role.
Justice Stevens's rejection of the three-tiered approach and his call for a
unitary analysis is partly a demand for even-handed judicial treatment of all
classificatory schemes and all affected groups. If, in the end, certain
classifications or groups receive less favorable outcomes in equal protection
143. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev. ed. 1999).
144. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be
Overruled, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 381, 382 (1992) ("[T]he Bill of Rights orders nothing less
than that government treat everyone subject to its dominion with equal concern and
respect...."). Stevens's views also seem to have some resonance with the theory
articulated in Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
1689 (1984).
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cases, the reason is not that they hold a different status in the eyes of law,
but simply because the same factors play out differently for them. Whether
something is currently a favored social cause-such as affirmative action in
some circles or color-blindness in others-should not affect the analysis.
Indefensible injustice on the basis of race may be more common than
indefensible injustice on more mundane bases, but in Stevens's eyes, an
injustice is an injustice is an injustice.
Although the unitary approach to equal protection focuses on
impartiality, it might be criticized for creating another kind of inequality
because of the lack of a more structured standard of review. The risk of
unpredictable outcomes is the most obvious criticism of the unitary
approach to equal protection, as opposed to the conventional three-tier
analysis. Such unpredictability not only raises concerns about the Court's
ability to give guidance for the future, but risks the creation of arbitrary
distinctions between similar cases as a result of ad hoc rulings.
Viewing the unitary approach as ad hoc and unpredictable seems natural,
especially since we have become so accustomed in recent decades to
elaborate multi-prong legal tests. 145 As the issue of black reparations
illustrates, however, this criticism may be weaker than it seems. The
predictability of the three-tier approach seems somewhat illusory in the
reparations setting, given the potential for manipulating both the
characterization of the classifications and the level of justification
demanded by the Court. In contrast, by placing reparations in a broader,
less politicized context-that of backward-looking statutory schemes-the
unitary approach seems to point toward a fairly clear acceptance of
reparations in principle, though with significant concerns about
implementation. Thus, in dealing with reparations or other politically
charged issues, the unitary scheme may hold up surprisingly well against
the competition in terms of predictability, despite the theoretical benefits of
a more rule-oriented approach.146
Justice Stevens has been criticized for favoring incremental decisions at
the expense of sweeping rulings that would decide many future disputes in
one fell swoop:
145. The classic critique of this now-popular approach to constitutional law is Robert F.
Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 165 (1985). As Nagel points out, the
effect of this approach is that "[tihe 'constitution' has become an ambitious political and
social agenda; the courts have become a kind of elevated bureaucracy, busily crafting
formulae that will bend the nation's affairs toward various visions dignified by constitutional
status." Id. at 211. Nagel questions the wisdom of this endeavor, but one might also question
its efficacy. At the end of the day the Court is an adjudicatory body and whatever general
formula it produces are only effective to the extent that they constrain future decisions. As
the travails of the three-prong test indicate, the operational effectiveness of formulaic
constraints may be questionable.
146. The three-tier equal protection methodology is part of a general effort to lay down
clear rules in decisions, with the expectation that later decisions will fall in line. For a
critique of this approach to the use of precedent, see Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and
the Law of Precedents, 90 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming May 2006).
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The question then is whether and when some slight diminution of
decisional confidence for issues not yet before the Court in the strictest
sense is a price worth paying in order to take more seriously the Court's
role as guider of the constitutional decisions of others. For Justice
Stevens, the answer seems to be, "almost never," while for others,
including me, it is perhaps closer to, "more often than we think." When
an issue arises as to which of the virtues of guidance outweigh the vices
of premature decision, it may turn out, surprisingly, that bigger really is
better. 147
This dichotomy may rest on a false assumption. "Large" opinions,
purporting to announce broad yet precise rules, may not settle as much as
they seem to. Despite their apparent precision, the rules may not provide as
much certainty in fact as they promise in theory. As the reparations dispute
illustrates, the seemingly clear-cut mandate for strict scrutiny in race cases
may not be especially determinate outside of the paradigmatic situation of
Jim Crow discrimination. And "small" opinions, based on careful attention
to the facts of each case, may provide a matrix of principles that provide
considerable guidance in future cases. For example, the gradual accretion
of small-scale rulings on backward-looking statutes turns out to provide
considerable guidance in thinking about the difficult issues of black
reparations. No doubt large opinions have their place, but there is also a
virtue-even in terms of providing predictable guidance-in thinking small.
Certainly, for Justice Stevens himself, "thinking small" has not been
motivated by a desire to use ad hoc decisions to implement personal values.
It is hard to read his opinions without perceiving a strenuous effort at
judicial impartiality, at insulating decisions from personal values. The
conventional approach seeks impartiality by entangling the judge in a web
of objective standards. Yet in practice, the standards often prove subject to
manipulation, and the very choice of standards seems to involve highly
politicized views about issues of race and gender. Rather than seeking
external constraints on the judge, the unitary approach promotes an internal
147. Frederick Schauer, Justice Stevens and the Size of Constitutional Decisions, 27
Rutgers L.J. 543, 561 (1996). Schauer elaborates,
If legions of constitutional decisionmakers outside of the Supreme Court
understand the Constitution, or constitutional law, as being primarily what the
Supreme Court says it is, then what the Supreme Court says takes on a different
function. From this perspective, the Supreme Court is not only in the business of
deciding cases, but is also in the business of telling other courts, as well as other
officials and other institutions, how to decide them. Yet if this is one of the Court's
goals, then it is not necessarily the case that smaller is better, and it is not
necessarily the case that making decisions maximally sensitive to the
circumstances of each case is the decision-making posture best designed to serve
this guidance function. From the perspective of the guidance function, the idea of
delaying decisions in order to maximize the likelihood of getting them right turns
out to be quite costly. A decision delayed, if unnecessary to the case at hand, may
have no costs in that case. By delaying the decision, however, an area of
uncertainty is created, and those who seek to be guided by Supreme Court
decisions will in fact receive little guidance.
Id. at 560.
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discipline. In a sense, the unitary scheme of equal protection is a form of
self-discipline. It draws the judge away from a visceral reaction to a
particular type of statute and demands comparisons with quite different
applications of legislative authority.
Such impartiality is not an unmixed blessing. It may have the drawback
of distracting attention from truly unique features of particular issues, such
as race. Moreover, it is impossible to obtain such impartiality completely.
Judges are human beings and necessarily bring their own past experiences
to bear when they consider legal issues. Impartiality does not consist in
extirpating the influence of personal experience and values. Rather, judges
must interrogate their responses to particular cases for consistency with
their general principles and their reasoning in other cases. This process
disciplines, but cannot eliminate, the personal element in judging. For
example Justice Stevens's opinions regarding veterans benefits could well
have been influenced by his own experiences as a member of the World
War I1 generation.
Nevertheless, in an era where judging is too often considered a purely
political exercise, this effort at impartiality deserves our admiration. It does
not take a belief in the immaculate conception of judicial decisions to affirm
that judges should strive for impartiality. In particular, while judges must
be attuned to social trends, they must not slavishly reflect political forces or
public opinion. Their role is not simply to implement the popular will. As
Justice Stevens himself has explained,
There is a critical difference between the work of the judge and the
work of other public officials. In a democracy, issues of policy are
properly decided by majority vote; it is the business of legislators and
executives to be popular. But in litigation, issues of law or fact should not
be determined by popular vote; it is the business of judges to be
indifferent to unpopularity. Sir Matthew Hale pointedly described this
essential attribute of the judicial office in words which have retained their
integrity for centuries:
"That popular or court applause or distaste have no influence in
anything I do, in point of distribution ofjustice.
"Not to be solicitous what men will say or think, so long as I keep
myself exactly according to the rule of justice."' 4 8
In this passage, we come close to the heart of Justice Stevens's vision of
the judicial role. It expresses both his willingness to strike out along his
own path ("[n]ot to be solicitous what men will say or think") and his quest
for impartiality (to "keep myself exactly according to the rule of justice").
Justice Stevens's question for impartiality represents an exemplary effort
to remain faithful to the dictates of the judicial oath of office to "administer
justice without respect to persons."'149 This vision explains Justice
148. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotations, citations, and internal numbering omitted).
149. In full, the oath provides,
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Stevens's demand for impartiality in equal protection doctrine, as well as
his willingness to examine fearlessly such controversial issues as black
reparations.
I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and
do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially
discharge all the duties incumbent on me as according to the best of my abilities
and understanding, agreeably to the constitution and the laws of the United States.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
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